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ABSTRACT
Delay/Disruption-Tolerant Networks (DTNs) have been around for
more than a decade and have especially been proposed to be used
in scenarios where communication infrastructure is unavailable. In
such scenarios, DTNs can offer a best-effort communication service
by exploiting user mobility. Natural disasters are an important appli-
cation scenario for DTNs when the cellular network is destroyed by
natural forces. To assess the performance of such networks before
deployment, we require appropriate knowledge of human mobility.
In this paper, we address this problem by designing, implement-
ing, and evaluating a novel mobility model for large-scale natural
disasters. Due to the lack of GPS traces, we reverse-engineer human
mobility of past natural disasters (focusing on 2010 Haiti earthquake
and 2013 Typhoon Haiyan) by leveraging knowledge of 126 experts
from 71 Disaster Response Organizations (DROs). By means of
simulation-based experiments, we compare and contrast our mobil-
ity model to other well-known models, and evaluate their impact
on DTN performance. Finally, we make our source code available
to the public.
KEYWORDS
Mobility model, disaster response, DTN
1 INTRODUCTION
Around the globe, we observe a continuous increase in natural dis-
aster occurrences [11]. When a disaster strikes, the communication
infrastructure is often destroyed or unavailable in the immediate
aftermath which hinders effective disaster relief work [5, 7].
In the humanitarian sector, messaging applications have proved
extremely helpful for both organizations as well as individuals as
they facilitate coordination and broadcasting information to the
public [6]. Smartphone-based DTNs present themselves as an at-
tractive technology for message-based communication in disaster
scenarios where the communication infrastructure is disrupted
or destroyed as these devices are readily available [17]. DTNs are
facilitated by user mobility as user devices act as data mules to
carry messages from a to b. Clearly, the underlying human mo-
bility greatly affects DTNs performance as disconnected network
partitions are unable to communicate.
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Current works on DTNs usually conduct simulation-based per-
formance evaluations but are lacking realistic mobility models for
large-scale natural disasters. This lack can be attributed to the un-
availability of public mobility traces due to security and privacy
concerns of cellular network operators as well as DROs. In this
paper, we approach the problem by creating a disaster scenario
mobility model based on expert knowledge. In particular, we make
the following contributions which are relevant for both the op-
portunistic and ad hoc network as well as the disaster response
communities:
• We model the mobility of disaster response teams as well
as the local population in real large-scale natural disasters.
Our model is based on expert knowledge, such as opera-
tional reports and conducted interviews, gathered from 126
individuals from 71 DROs.
• We characterize our mobility model and compare it with
two other widely used models via simulation. In addition,
we demonstrate the impact of mobility on DTN performance.
• We provide an open source implementation [23] of our Nat-
ural Disaster mobility model as well as two exemplary sce-
narios: the 2010 Haiti earthquake [5] and the 2013 Typhoon
Haiyan [7].
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: we first revisit the
state-of-the-art of mobility models and DTN simulation in Section 2.
We explain our approach in Section 3. Then, we present our mobility
model and scenario design in Section 4 and their implementation
in Section 5. We analyze and evaluate the impact of our mobility
model in Section 6 and, finally, conclude in Section 7.
2 RELATEDWORK
Generic mobility models such as Random Waypoint (RWP) have
been used to study the performance of mobile wireless networks
such as DTNs. However, these models do not capture the non-
randomness of human mobility and, therefore, produce question-
able results when trying to understand network performance in
realistic scenarios. To alleviate this problem, multiple works (see
Table 1) have sought to create domain-specific models: [2] proposes
Disaster Area which models disaster scenarios based on traces col-
lected at a fire fighter manoeuvre. This model has been used multi-
ple times to evaluate performance of mobile networks, e. g., [12, 20].
[10] proposes a micro-movement pattern generation framework for
search-and-rescue missions. [9] states the need for expert knowl-
edge to create realistic scenarios. [25] is closest related to our work
as they attempt to model a large-scale post-disaster scenario. How-
ever, they claim that “no documents/reports happen to describe the
Table 1: Related publications on disaster and emergency re-
sponse mobility models. (∗) indicates a work that proposes
a new model. Our work is printed in bold.
Work Nodes Area (m2) Duration Mobility Model
[16] 100 1000 25 min Event–Role ∗
[2] 150 350 × 200 27.7 h Disaster Area ∗
[12] ≤ 80 700 × 600 10 min Disaster Area [2]
[1] ≤ 200 ≤ 550 × 500 30 min Disaster Area [2]
[20] 200 550 × 500 5 min Disaster Area [2]
[9] 150 350 × 200 1.1 h Disaster Area [2]
[10] 100 6000 × 5000 35 h Search & Rescue ∗
[25] 234 N/A 4 days Natural Disaster ∗
— 500 5000 × 7000 7 days Natural Disaster ∗
disaster operation in as detail as required to reproduce the scene
by a simulator.” In our work, we tackle precisely this problem and
reverse-engineer human mobility at a granularity-level suitable for
a simulator by using information from public and non-public doc-
uments and by conducting interviews with various International
Disaster Response (IDR) experts.
3 METHODOLOGY
GPS mobility traces are the “holy grail” for creating accurate mo-
bility models. Unfortunately, such ground truth data during and
post disaster especially from Disaster Response Teams (DRTs) are
not (publicly) available. This is due to the plain lack of records,
strict data privacy laws, mobile network operators protecting their
valuable business assets, as well as security concerns of DROs who
do not wish to disclose sensitive location information of their staff,
especially when operating in armed-conflict areas.
As a consequence, we follow an alternative approach: we base
our mobility model on “soft” data, in particular, expert knowledge of
various DROs. In order for this method to yield acceptable results,
we need to ensure that (1) the model input is sufficiently fine-
grained for extracting mobility patterns, (2) the model is verified
by a group of experts.
Unfortunately, documentation of the events during a disaster is
often incomplete: media coverage of high-profile disaster is vast but
articles typically lack technical details. Also, first responders and
DRO contacts
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Figure 1: Our process for information gathering, model de-
sign and implementation, verification, and evaluation.
disaster relief workers are supposed to create daily reports but can
often invest only minimal time as they prioritize actual life-saving
work. This often leads incomplete or imprecise documentation
unusable for our purposes. To understand IDR and eventually derive
our mobility model, we gathered information from
(1) DRO policies, guidelines, strategies and fieldbooks partly
gathered from online disaster response platforms, and
(2) individual (on-site) interviews with disaster relief experts.
Our approach is visualized in Fig. 1. During the process, we con-
tacted 298 and received feedback from 126 IDR experts (42 % re-
sponse rate). From the responders, we received additional informa-
tion about their humanitarian activities, past mission reports, and
pointers to other experts and contacts better suited for replying
to our inquiry. In addition, we received access to exclusive online
platforms and forums such as the Virtual On-Site Operations Coor-
dination Centre (VOSOCC) of the UN Office for the Coordination
of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), reliefweb.int, and humanitari-
anresponse.info. They contain field handbooks and guidelines for
in-field operations which are not publicly accessible. Furthermore,
we were able to conduct 15 on-site interviews with IDR experts and
former disaster relief workers. Those experts were also involved in
the verification loop from design to implementation.
4 DESIGN
In this section, we review past candidate events which qualify for
our methodology. We then provide a detailed time-line of events for
one recent high-profile disaster: 2013 Typhoon Haiyan. The same
information for the 2010 Haiti earthquake is available in [22] but
was omitted here for brevity. From the description and a number
of policy documents and guidelines provided by DROs, we extract
structured elements such as the different actors and their activities
which we finally pour into a novel generic mobility model.
4.1 Scenario Selection Criteria
Table 2 lists recent natural disasters and their scale. We found that
the following six factors are key for the creation of scenarios and
models for DTN research in the area of natural disasters: (1) the
number of affected people and (2) the size of the affected area both
define the scope of the disaster; (3) geographic conditions are impor-
tant as impassable natural obstacles such as rivers or lakes would
partition the network and render a DTN deployment unusable;
(4) the availability of infrastructure (bridges, airports, power plants,
cellular network, etc.) after the disaster; and (5) strong international
response by DROs as they are the sources for (6) sufficient, fine-
grained information on the event. The latter is the most important
factor for us as we base our model and scenario design solely on
written and oral reports. Note that we did not include all presented
factors in Table 2 due to space reasons, but provide an extended
version in [22].
4.2 2013 Typhoon Haiyan
We chose to re-create human mobility of the 2013 Typhoon Haiyan
as media coverage and response was high, and communication in-
frastructure was dysfunctional during the first days. In this section,
we will give an overview of the disaster and describe the situation
in detail during the first week (days zero to six). The following
Table 2: Large-scale natural disasters in the last ten years. Ratings range from low (∗) to high (∗∗∗). Our scenarios are printed
in bold. We selected Typhoon Haiyan as the running example for this paper.
Disaster Year Country Killed Injured Displaced Area (km2) Response Information
Nepal earthquake 2015 Nepal 9 000 22 000 2 600 000 3 610 ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗
Cyclone Pam 2015 Vanuatu 24 30 3 300 12 190 ∗∗ ∗∗
Ludian earthquake 2014 China 617 2 400 229 700 1 487 ∗ ∗
Typhoon Haiyan 2013 Philippines 6 300 28 689 6 000 000 71 503 ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗
Christchurch earthquake 2011 New Zealand 185 2 000 — 1 426 ∗∗ ∗∗∗
East Africa drought 2011 East Africa 260 000 — 5 720 000 2 346 466 ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗
Tropical storm Washi 2011 Philippines 1 292 2 002 430 900 104 530 ∗∗ ∗
Tohoku earthquake 2011 Japan 15 894 6 152 340 000 83 955 ∗∗ ∗∗∗
Haiti earthquake 2010 Haiti 316 000 300 000 895 000 27 750 ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗
Afghanistan blizzard 2008 Afghanistan 926 100 — 652 864 ∗ ∗
Sichuan earthquake 2008 China 69 195 374 643 5 000 000 485 000 ∗∗ ∗∗∗
Cyclone Nargis 2008 Myanmar 138 000 — 800 000 676 578 ∗∗ ∗∗
information was gathered through interviews1 with multiple first
responder eyewitnesses from different relief organizations, as well
as press articles about the relief efforts.
Summary. Typhoon Haiyan lasted from November 3rd to 11th,
2013 and was one of the strongest tropical cyclones ever recorded
[18]. Even though typhoon Haiyan had devastating effects on large
portions of Southeast Asia, for the purpose of this work we will
focus on the aftermath of November 8th when Typhoon Haiyan
hit the Philippines at 04:40 local time. Haiyan was the deadliest
and most damaging Philippine typhoon on record and left more
than one million houses partially or totally damaged, killing at
least 6 300 people and leaving numerous injured and homeless [15].
Typhoon Haiyan was ranked as a category 5 typhoon, the highest
category by the definition of the Saffir–Simpson Hurricane Wind
Scale (SSHWS), implying that “catastrophic damage will occur” and
“most of the area will be uninhabitable for weeks or months.” After
the storm had passed, widespread damage became visible with
power lines cut off, roads blocked by fallen debris, and trees and
buildings collapsed under the strong winds [19]. A 2013 preliminary
estimate [14] calculated the total damage related to typhoon Haiyan
to be around 2.86 billion US$. Figure 2 depicts the city of Tacloban
and its surroundings, which were severely hit by Typhoon Haiyan,
and is intended to provide visual guidance to the reader for a better
understanding of the upcoming sections.
Right after the disaster had hit the Philippines, many officials
concluded that even though early warnings had been issued to the
population of potentially affected areas, only few people actually
evacuated. This was likely related to the high number of smaller
typhoons the Philippines experience every year, which led to the
population underestimating the severity of the coming typhoon.
Warnings were broadcast on TV and radio, but went largely un-
heeded. The typhoon was accompanied by the biggest storm surge
ever experienced within the Philippines, reportedly reaching be-
tween four to six meters in height [24]. This resulted in fast-rising
tides and surge water brought by the typhoon, which led to many
additional fatalities [4].
1Interview notes are available upon request.
Day 0. In the aftermath of the typhoon, the immediate arrival of
DRTs was hindered by the severe damage the airport had sustained.
Therefore, many DRTs were rerouted to the airport of the nearby
island of Cebu, which was still operational. From there, they had to
travel to Tacloban using other means, which took around 8 hours.
This slowed down the initial arrival of DRTs considerably. Despite
the damage, a number of airplanes and helicopters managed to land
in Tacloban, delivering aid and personnel. The newly arrived DRTs
registered at the Reception/Departure Centre (RDC) before pro-
ceeding into the city to reach the On-Site Operations Coordination
Centre (OSOCC). There were also a number of storm chasers and
typhoon experts already on the ground when Haiyan made landfall.
In search of scientific evidence, they moved through the city before,
during and after the typhoon. (For our mobility model, we will
assume that they are distributed randomly throughout the city.)
The local population spent the storm in their homes or shelters.
After the storm had passed, eyewitnesses report that most of the
population seemed to wander around the perimeter of their home
or shelter area, overwhelmed by the destruction caused by the
storm, or trying to help their neighbors. (For our mobility model,
we will assume their locations to be randomly spread throughout
the city.) At the end of the day, DRTs and experts alike returned to
their respective sleeping spots.
Day 1 to 3. On the first day after the disaster, the US Navy
deployed radar equipment to the Tacloban airport, allowing it to
be re-opened in short order. This allowed a greater number of
DRTs and relief goods to arrive close to the city, leading to more
travel between the airport and the city. Arriving DRTs reported at
the RDC and then proceeded to the OSOCC, which was located
in the city center. Afterwards, they traveled to the base camp of
their organization and began their relief efforts. The initial focus of
most DRTs lies with Search and Rescue Operations (SROs), as the
likelihood of finding survivors drops with every hour. Urban Search
and Rescue Teams (USRTs) have a large number of different search
strategies. (For the purpose of the movement model, we implement
a basic strategy: a start area is chosen, and the team searches every
house along that street before spreading out to the next street in
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Figure 2: City of Tacloban with locations of IDR-relevant
sites in the early aftermath of 2013 Typhoon Haiyan.
the direct neighborhood.) Eyewitnesses indicate that during the
first three days, the civilian population was mostly concerned with
search for food and the rebuilding of their homes or temporary
shelters. Healthy survivors assisted with local search and rescue
efforts and cleared the street from debris, staying in the general area
of their homes or shelters. Injured survivors were transported to
one of the partially operational city hospitals, which were quickly
filled to capacity. As the government still remained in office, the
relief organizations had to coordinate with country officials. This
led to some traffic between the city hall and OSOCC. The United
Nations (UN) rented a hotel as a temporary office location for the
duration of the rebuilding efforts.2 All DRTs continued to return to
their respective base camps for the night.
Day 4 to 6. SROs were reduced and came to a stop at the end of
the first week, as the chance of finding survivors drops significantly
after several days. After about one week, most of the USRTs are
replaced by teams specialized in other forms of disaster relief. The
distribution of food and clean water remained a challenge, as the
infrastructure was severely damaged by the typhoon. Much of the
local population had to collect food and water from distribution
points around the city on a daily basis. The local population assisted
DRTs in clearing the roads of debris to allow trucks to pass through
them. The government also ordered the removal of dead bodies to
prevent the spread of diseases. The US Marines started flying out
injured locals and exhausted relief workers alike. At the same time,
2We were asked not to publish the location of the hotel, so we randomly chose a hotel
in the city for the purposes of the simulation.
new DRTs were still arriving via the airport, following the same
procedure as previously described.
After Week 1.We stop our description of the events after the
first week. At this time, locals had slowly begun to resume a sem-
blance of their normal lives, and the scenario gradually transforms
into a scenario of daily routine, where a dedicated mobility model
no longer applies. For the same reason, we did not consider that
most DROs have a rotation mechanism for their employees, which
prevents them from becoming mentally and physically exhausted
from the demanding work in disaster relief.
4.3 Natural Disaster Mobility Model
Based on the information gathered for specific disasters, we extract
recurring behavioral patterns of the various entities involved in
disaster relief work. To this end, we define roles and role-specific
activities, and also consider movement speed.
Roles.We identified the main stakeholders in natural disaster-
struck areas (scenario-independent) and defined the following seven
roles with distinct behavioral patterns: (1) healthy local population,
(2) injured local population, (3) Disaster Response Teams (DRTs)
from DROs, (4) dedicated Urban Search and Rescue Teams (USRTs),
(5) scientists (storm chasers, typhoon experts, etc.), (6) UN officials,
and (7) government officials.
Activities. To create a model, we further need to define activi-
ties that regularly occur in disaster areas that can be attributed to
specific roles. Figure 3 summarizes the various activities by show-
ing the coarse locations of each role during the course of the first
week. What follows is a detailed but non-exhaustive description of
important activities that have been identified during the interviews
with IDR experts.
Activities applying to everyone. In the evening, everyone goes to
their respective base camp, home, or shelter to sleep. Those arriving
via the airport (e. g., DROs), at the day of arrival, first go to the RDC
for registration, then visit the OSOCC, and finally set up the base
camp or sleeping place.
Activities applying to DROs and DRTs. After arriving and regis-
tering at the airport, they go to the OSOCC or the town hall for a
situation briefing and then start to help the affected population with
one of the following activities: (i) collect dead bodies and organize
burials; (ii) walk the main streets of the city and clean streets from
debris, such that supplies can be delivered; or (iii) go to food and
water distribution centers to serve the locals until the end of the
day. Besides that, they regularly visit the UN hotel, the OSOCC site,
the base camp, or town hall to meet with officials and other DROs.
Activities applying to UN and government officials. Officials regu-
larly (at least daily) visit the OSOCC, the town hall or base camp,
for a situation briefing and meet other officials and DROs. During
the day, they perform reconnaissance missions to get an situation
overview such as infrastructural damage. This information is used
to provision help. Also, they organize the disaster relief efforts
with other officials and DROs such as setting up food and water
distribution spots, organizing burials, etc.
Activities applying to scientists.Within the first two to three days,
they collect scientific evidence from the disaster site before the
cleaning of the rubble and debris starts. When their job is done,
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Figure 3: Activity-based location of different groups over time. Time values are indicative, i. e., activities do not start exactly
at the same time but with a random jitter of one or two hours.
they either leave the area via the airport, or decide to volunteer and
help the DROs.
Activities applying to USRT. After arriving and registering at
the airport, they go to the OSOCC for a situation briefing and SRO
planning.When starting an SRO, USRTs go to the chosen location in
the morning and then search every house in that street. When done,
they repeat with next street in the direct neighborhood. Usually,
SROs are stopped after one week as the chances to find survivors
diminish, and USRTs fly back home.
Activities applying to healthy local population. According to eye
witnesses, most locals stay at home or try to find friends and family
members within the immediate surroundings after the disaster has
struck. Later on the first day, they stay in the proximity of their
homes to assess the damage and to help their neighbors. Then, they
start to look for food and water, for example, at distribution centers
where they will return on a daily basis. The rest of the day, they
either volunteer for cleaning operations (we model this by slowly
roaming around the city), or as replacement of security personnel
to patrol the area.
Activities applying to injured local population. Depending on the
severeness, the injured stay at home if they are unable to move, or
try to go to the closest hospital as soon as possible. Upon arrival,
they stay at the hospital if its capacity is not exhausted or leave to
find another one otherwise.
Typhoon Haiyan Arrival Times.Most scientists, particularly
storm chasers and typhoon experts were already present prior to the
occurrence of the disaster. Furthermore, government officials were
already present prior to the disaster, while UN officials arrived after
the disaster had struck. DROs and USRTs mainly arrived via the
airport during the first days after the disaster as they were delayed
due to the damaged airport. However, some had been prepositioned
to locations close to the affected area and arrived on day zero.
Movement Speed. For the purpose of this work, we consider
walking the only viable form of movement. This is due to the fact
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Figure 4: Technical workflow for generating a scenario’s
map data for our Natural Disaster mobility model.
that within disaster-struck areas, debris, flood/surge water, or earth-
quakes often render streets completely unusable for cars and trucks
until they can be repaired. This means that all entities move approx-
imately at walking speed. Nevertheless, there are slight differences
depending on the entity’s role. For example, injured individuals and
heavily equipped USRTs will be slower than normal. Note that our
model could be extended to support faster-traveling vehicles, but
would require additional scenario-specific information currently
unavailable to us, such as who has access to vehicles and which
streets are passable.
5 IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we briefly describe the implementation of our generic
Natural Disaster mobility model and the workflow for generating
specific scenarios. This is a trade-off between code re-usability (re-
occurring behavioral patterns of certain groups such as DROs and
the local population) and acknowledging the uniqueness of every
disaster (terrain, streets, point of interests (POIs), arrival times,
population density, etc.)
Mobility Model.We implement our mobility model directly as
a module for the Opportunistic Network Simulator (ONE) [8] as
we are concerned with DTN simulation. Our model implements
the different roles and activities as defined in Section 4. These roles
and activities have been observed in different disasters (Table 2)
and as such are generally independent of the scenario instance.
Nevertheless, our model can only operate on a specific scenario.
Scenario.A scenario describes the prevailing conditions of a spe-
cific post-disaster situation. In particular, the scenario comprises
the number of actors as well as a street map including different POIs
of the affected area. We generate the map data using a number of
tools shown in Fig. 4: we start with exporting OpenStreetMap data
and converting it to the Well-Known Text (.wkt) file format using
osm2wkt [13]. Finally, we use OpenJUMP to add POI locations, such
as the OSOCC, airports, and hospitals as shown in Fig. 2. The .wkt
files can then be processed by our mobility model implemented in
the ONE. In this paper, we only focus on the area around the city
of Tacloban which was severely hit by Typhoon Haiyan. However,
we have also implemented a scenario for the 2010 Haiti earthquake
(Port-au-Prince and surroundings) which is discussed in [22] and
included in our source code [23]. Using our model, workflow, and
explanations in [22], third parties are able to create additional sce-
narios. In addition, our implementation is open to extensions such
as more detailed activities, vehicle support, etc.
6 EVALUATION
In this section, we want to (i) visually validate our mobility model
(ND), (ii) identify qualitative differences between ND and other
contemporary models, (iii) assess the impact that different mobility
models have DTN performance, and finally (iv) give actionable
advice to DTN protocol designers. To this end, we compare ND
with two other widely used models: the RandomWaypoint Mobility
model (RWP) and a map-based RWP model (Map) where waypoint
selection is still random, but node movement is confined to a street
grid.We selected the epidemicDTN routing protocol for the network
performance analysis as its simple design facilitates reasoning about
the results. For all experiments, we rely on the ONE simulator v1.6.0
[8]. Each experiment is averaged over 10 independently seeded runs.
We summarize the most important simulation settings in Table 3
and refer to our source code [23] for all details. For reproducibility,
we also publish our experiment data set [21].
We note the limitation of our simulation setup with only 500
nodes. Even though our mobility model supports an arbitrary num-
ber of nodes, current network simulators (ONE, ns-2/3, etc.) do not
scale to a large number of nodes, e. g., the population size in an
urban area (order of 106). However, as we will show, we can demon-
strate qualitative differences between the different mobility models
already with a rather low number of nodes. We also note that in our
traffic model, sources and destinations as well as messages sizes
are arbitrarily chosen. A realistic communication model would be
incredibly useful but is orthogonal to our work.
6.1 Characterizing Mobility
We are interested in the spatial node distribution and encounters
that occur during a disaster since they both affect the applicability
of a DTN: node hot spots can function as communication hubs
Table 3: The ONE Simulation Settings
Scenario
Dimensions 5000 × 7000m2 (Tacloban)
Simulation time 7 days
Nodes 500
Mobility
Model RWP, Map, ND
Speed (m/s) 0.5–1.5 ≈ walking speed
Routing
Algorithm Epidemic
Buffer size 20 MB
Taffic
Msg. interval 8–12 s
Msg. TTL 6 h
Msg. size 50–100 KB
Comm.
PHY rate 2 Mbit/s ≈ Bluetooth
Radio range 10m
where messages are quickly exchanged, while nodes that have a lot
of encounters can act as “data mules” and transport messages over
larger distances.
Spatial Node Distribution.We visualize the spatial node dis-
tribution of the three mobility models using a scatter-plot heatmap
in Fig. 5. In Fig. 5a, we identify the typical non-uniform center-
weighted distribution [3] of the RWP model. From a practical per-
spective, this means that nodes are moving across inaccessible
areas, for example, a bay. In contrast, Map and ND (Figs. 5b and 5c)
essentially “redraw” the underlying street grid. Here, the nodes’
movements are confined to streets and paths and are thus no longer
moving across water. However, node distribution in Map across
streets appears generally uniform. There are only minor hot spots at
street intersections which are expected since movement trajectories
cross there. In general, nodes are located with similar probabilities
at any point in the map. Figure 5c shows that ND exhibits character-
istic hot spots that can be mapped to certain POIs in the street map
(Fig. 5d) where many nodes stay for a longer period of time. Most
prevalent are the locations of the OSOCC and the base camp as
they are frequented by DRTs and officials. In addition, we can also
make out other hot spots at the city hall and the food and water
distribution points. In the simulation, the airport is the location
for inactive nodes, that is, those nodes that have not yet arrived
and those that have already left. The hot spots around the airport
can therefore be considered an artifact as the simulator does not
support removing nodes from a running simulation.
Encounters. An encounter is a transmission opportunity which
occurs if two nodes move in each other’s transmission range. DTNs
performance highly depends on the number of encounters a node
makes while moving around. For example: if a node encounters the
destination of any currently carried message, it can directly deliver
it. The advantage of direct delivery is that it prevents the replication
overhead to intermediate nodes in form of radio transmissions
and storage consumption. So, in a scenario where communicating
parties are generally physically close to one another, or at least
meet regularly, a DTN deployment could exclusively rely on direct
deliveries. Therefore, assessing the encounter characteristics of the
underlying mobility model in a scenario is of utmost importance
to understand which protocols are suitable for a natural disaster
scenario. In Fig. 6, we observe that in ND, the local population
groups (healthy and injured) make significantly fewer contacts
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Figure 5: Spatial node distribution in different mobility models averaged over 7 days. Node counts are sampled from a grid of
10 × 10 m squares. Circle sizes and colors scale logarithmically with node count to highlight hot spots.
than the other groups. Especially the injured encounter very few
other nodes. On the other hand, DRO teams as well as government
and UN officials make significantly more contacts due to regular
meetings at the OSOCC, in the town hall, and in the base camps. In
the RWP andMapmodels, the number of encounters solely depends
on the average velocity of the user role. For example, injured as
well as heavily equipped USRTs move slower than the other groups.
The generally low number of encounters of RWP can be explained
by the low node density in combination with the low transmission
range: as the nodes freely move around the large area, nodes only
infrequently move into each others transmission range.
6.2 Characterizing Network Performance
We evaluate the impact of our mobility model on network per-
formance. For this, we measure the delivery rate and delay, the
buffer occupancy, as well as the delivery rate for the different roles.
In Fig. 7, we observe that the delivery delay short in ND, mean-
ing that about 80 % of all delivered messages are delivered within
three hours, which appears to be due to the regular meetings at
certain POIs. However, we can see in Fig. 9 that delivery success
is highly heterogeneous with respect to the user role in ND. We
observe that the most successful communication partners are the
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Figure 6: Number of encounters per node (1 week).
ones that make the most encounters, in particular, DROs, USRTs,
and government/UN officials. These are the groups that can rely on
message deliveries the most and are, thus, the main beneficiaries of
the communication network. On the other hand, less mobile nodes,
especially the injured population, are poorly connected to the rest.
Without special treatment (e. g., via prioritization), these users will
be insufficiently served by the network. In RWP and Map, perfor-
mance is almost uniform across the different group (not shown
here). The overall delivery success of ND is lower than for Map
which is likely due to the fact that at night, when mobility is low,
only few messages are delivered. This is supported by Fig. 8 which
shows that buffer occupancy is depending on the time of day. Dur-
ing the night, undelivered messages expire and nodes remove them
from their buffers. Starting around noon, buffers refill with new
messages as nodes travel across the map and collect messages from
others, leading to more message deliveries during the day. Note that
the delivery success over time is not shown here for space reasons,
but follows the same cyclic behavior as the buffer occupancy.
7 CONCLUSION
DTNs could greatly facilitate disaster response communications as
they allow message-based communication even in the absence of
supporting infrastructure. However, so far, the communication com-
munity has yet to prove the practicality of DTNs for such scenarios.
In this paper, we have shown the feasibility of reverse engineer-
ing human mobility solely by written or oral reports and have
extract general as well as scenario-specific features and patterns.
Based on two exemplary scenario, we were able to assess the per-
formance of DTNs in large-scale natural disasters as a backup for
infrastructure-based communication, and develop a tool for future
works in this area. In particular, we observed that a DTN deploy-
ment could be most useful for disaster relief workers due to regular
meetings, while the population benefits to a lesser degree. Based on
these observations, we give advice to DTN designers such as prefer-
ring frequently traveling nodes as relays and exploiting hot spots
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Figure 7: Message delivery success and de-
lay as a cumulative distribution function.
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Figure 9: Delivery rates between
roles (ND).
by deploying fixed DTN nodes to serve as information exchange
hubs. In the future, we could increase the level of detail in our
mobility model, for example, by including vehicles. Our network
performance evaluation could be extended, which would require to
increase the scalability of current simulators to support simulations
with significantly more nodes. Finally, a realistic communication
model of all users in a disaster scenario would complement our
mobility model since communication patterns and user mobility
are the two main factors influencing DTN performance.
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